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Using data on stock purchases individual investors made through a discount broker from 1991 to 
1996, we study information diffusion effects—the relation between household investment 
choices and those made by their neighbors. A ten percentage point increase in neighbors’ 
purchases of stocks from an industry is associated with a two percentage point increase in the 
household’s own purchases of stocks from that industry, with the effect considerably larger for 
purchases of local stocks. The presence of information diffusion effects is robust to controls for 
potential inside information effects and to household fixed effects. Upon controlling for 
aggregate trading patterns, households’ and neighbors’ investment style preferences, and the 
industry composition of local firms, we attribute approximately one-third to one-half of the 
overall diffusion effect to word-of-mouth communication. Disentangling the overall diffusion 
effect suggests that the significant relation between our measures of information diffusion and 
subsequent industry-level returns appears to be driven by its word-of-mouth component. 
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Although individual investors hold approximately one-half of the stock market in the U.S., 
relatively little is known about what governs their investment decisions. Generally, individual 
investors may choose to buy stocks for a variety of reasons
1 and may consider a broad spectrum 
of information sources.  In this paper we study information diffusion effects among individual 
investors—the relation between the investment choices made by an individual investor’s 
neighborhood and the investor’s own investment choices. Information diffusion effects among 
individual investors in the U.S. have received relatively little attention in the academic literature, 
probably because of the lack of detailed data. If present, such effects undoubtedly can affect 
individual investors’ asset allocation decisions. Moreover, trades based on information diffusion 
might be sufficiently correlated and condensed in time to affect stock prices. 
In the domain of institutional investors, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2003) study word-of-
mouth effects among mutual fund managers and find that “…a manager is more likely to hold (or 
buy, or sell) a particular stock in any quarter if other managers in the same city are holding (or 
buying, or selling) that same stock.” Similarly, individual investors may seek to reduce search 
costs and circumvent their lack of expertise by relying on word-of-mouth communication with 
those around them. Indeed, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) present a model in which stock 
market participation may be influenced by social interaction.  Such social interaction can serve 
as a mechanism for information exchange via “word-of-mouth” and/or “observational learning” 
(Banerjee (1992), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995)).  
Duflo and Saez (2002, 2003) present evidence of peer effects in a related context—
retirement plans. They find that an employee’s participation in retirement plans and choices 
within those plans are affected by participation decisions and choices made by other employees 
in the same department. 
In the international arena, Feng and Seasholes (2004) present evidence of herding effects 
among individual investors who hold individual brokerage accounts in the People’s Republic of 
China. A unique feature of their data (investors have to place trades only in the brokerage house 
in which they opened an account) enables Feng and Seasholes to disentangle word-of-mouth 
effects from common reaction to releases of public information. They find that common reaction 
to public information (trades placed across branches in the same region, local to the company), 
                                                 
1 For a recent review see Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2003).   2  
rather than word-of-mouth effects (trades placed in the same branch), seems to be a primary 
determinant of herding in this context. 
We study information diffusion effects among U.S. individual investors by using a 
detailed data set of common-stock investments 35,673 U.S. households made through a large 
discount brokerage in the period 1991 to 1996. We pay attention to the overall magnitude of the 
effect, as well as to its heterogeneity across industries and across time. We also investigate 
whether high levels of information diffusion have predictive power for future industry-level 
returns. Moreover, we disentangle the diffusion among the influences of common preferences, 
structure of the local industry, and word-of-mouth effects. We find that disentangling the overall 
information diffusion effect suggests that the significant relation between diffusion and 
subsequent industry-level returns appears to be driven by its word-of-mouth component. 
We find a strong information diffusion effect (“neighborhood effect”): a ten percentage 
point increase in purchases of stocks from an industry made by a household’s neighbors is 
associated with a two percentage point increase in the household’s own purchases of stocks from 
that industry. We pay particular attention to the differentiation between information diffusion 
effects related to local stocks (defined as companies headquartered within 50 miles from the 
household) and the effects related to non-local stocks. While the key neighborhood effects—
similarity in preferences, the impact of the structure of the local industry, and word-of-mouth—
can prevail among the investments both local and non-local to the household, most of those 
effects will likely be far more pronounced among local investments because, as demonstrated for 
both professional money managers (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001) and individual investors 
(Ivković and Weisbenner, 2004), the flow of value-relevant information regarding local 
companies appears to be higher and of better quality than the comparable flow regarding remote, 
non-local companies.  
Not surprisingly, we indeed find that information diffusion effects are considerably 
stronger for local purchases than for non-local ones. For example, if the neighborhood’s 
allocation of local purchases to a particular industry increases by ten percentage points, a 
household tends to increase its own allocation of local purchases to the industry by a comparable 
amount. This result adds another dimension to the already documented high degrees of 
individual investors’ locality, both in the U.S. (Ivković and Weisbenner (2004), Zhu (2002)) and 
abroad (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Massa and Simonov (2003)): not only do investors tend   3  
disproportionately to invest locally, but there are also strong information diffusion effects in their 
neighborhood.  
In an attempt to study the way information diffusion effects dissipate over time and 
space, we show that there is a relation between a household’s own purchases and purchases made 
by the household’s neighbors not only contemporaneously, but also with a lag of up to four 
quarters. As for space, we find that information diffusion effects wane fairly quickly beyond the 
distance of 50 miles; purchases by those residing 100 miles away have only one-tenth of the 
impact that purchases by the immediate neighbors (residing within 50 miles) have. 
We further find that a household’s sensitivity to neighbors’ investment choices increases 
with the population of the household’s community. Such diffusion in stock trading affects 
individual investors’ asset allocation decisions. For example, although residents in larger 
metropolitan areas have substantially more diverse investment opportunities and tend to invest 
more in local stocks, we find that their local stock investments tend to remain just as 
concentrated as residents of less populated communities that have a significantly smaller pool of 
potential local investments. This tendency is consistent with the notion that residents in more 
populous geographic areas might be exposed to word-of-mouth effects to a higher degree than 
residents in less highly populated areas. 
Our inquiry extends beyond establishing the existence of industry-level information 
diffusion effects, attributing them, and characterizing them; we also investigate whether the 
extent of information diffusion effects has predictive power for future industry-level returns. We 
find that, even after controlling for aggregate individual investors’ trading activity (i.e., the buy-
sell imbalance in that industry) and past industry-level performance, non-local information 
diffusion is positively associated with future industry returns: an increase in information 
diffusion equal to the interquartile range of the estimates of information diffusion across 322 
industry-quarter observations is associated with a two to three percentage point increase in 
industry returns over the following year. Moreover, we buttress these results by presenting an 
explanation that relates the role of non-local diffusion with a gradual diffusion of value-relevant 
information from local investors to non-local ones, accompanied with appropriate trading 
patterns. 
Finally, to disentangle the contributions of correlated preferences and the structure of the 
local economy to the observed correlation between individual investors stock purchases and   4  
those of their neighbors from “word-of-mouth” effects, we consider the households’ own 
preferences (as revealed by the composition of their respective portfolios across industries at the 
beginning of each quarterly investment period), preferences of the households’ respective 
neighborhoods (as revealed by the composition of the neighborhoods’ aggregate portfolios), as 
well as the composition of local firms and workers by industry. We find that one-third to one-
half of the overall neighborhood effect among both local and non-local investments cannot be 
attributed to these sources. We regard the remaining portions of the neighborhood effect as a 
conservative lower bound on the impact of word-of-mouth communication effects on household 
trading decisions. Disentangling the overall information diffusion effect into word-of mouth 
communication and other diffusion effects yields further insight as to how correlated trading 
among individuals may influence stock prices. The significant relation between non-local 
diffusion and subsequent industry-level returns appears to be driven by the word-of-mouth 
component. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that word-of-mouth communication 
creates a more dynamic exchange of information that may lead to a ripple effect of further 
information dissemination, which in turn may eventually impact stock prices. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data and 
summary statistics. We present our basic findings concerning information diffusion in Section II. 
Section III analyzes the dissipation of diffusion effects across time and space and explores the 
relation between diffusion effects and location. Section IV documents the heterogeneity of 
information diffusion across industries and across time and relates future industry-level returns to 
our estimates of information diffusion. We identify the contributions of correlated preferences, 
the structure of the local economy, and word-of-mouth communication to overall diffusion in 
individuals’ investment choices in Section V. Section VI concludes. 
I. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
A. Data 
We compile the data from several sources. The primary source is a large data set, 
obtained from a large discount broker, of individual investors’ monthly positions and trades over 
a six-year period from 1991 to 1996. The data set covers all the investments that 78,000 
households made through the discount broker, including common stocks, mutual funds, 
government and corporate bonds, foreign securities, and derivatives. Each household could have   5  
as few as one account and as many as 21 accounts (the median number of accounts is two). For a 
detailed description of the data set see Barber and Odean (2000). 
In this paper we focus on the common stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq 
exchanges. Common stock investments constitute roughly three-quarters of the total value of 
household investments through the brokerage house in the sample. We use the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to obtain information on stock prices and returns 
and COMPUSTAT to obtain several firm characteristics, including company headquarters 
location (identified by its state and county codes). We use the headquarters location as opposed 
to the state of incorporation because firms often do not have the majority of their operations in 
their state of incorporation.
2 
The sample of households used in this study is a subset of the entire collection of 
households for which we could ascertain their zip code and thus determine their location. We 
obtained the latitude and longitude for each of the zip codes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database. The corresponding company location comes from the 
COMPUSTAT Annual Research Files, which contain the information regarding the company 
headquarters’ county code. Finally, we identify the latitude and longitude for each county from 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database as well. We use the standard 
formula for computing the distance d(a,b) in statutory miles between two points a and b as 
follows: 
d(a,b) = arccos{cos(a1)cos(a2)cos(b1)cos(b2)+cos(a1)sin(a2)cos(b1)sin(b2)+sin(a1)sin(b1)} r,       (1) 
where a1 and b1 (a2 and b2) are the latitudes (longitudes) of the two points (expressed in radians), 
respectively, and r denotes the radius of the Earth (approximately 3,963 statutory miles). 
We exclude the stocks we could not match with CRSP and COMPUSTAT; they were 
most likely listed on smaller exchanges. We also exclude stocks not headquartered in the 
continental U.S.  The resulting “market”—the universe of stocks we could obtain the necessary 
characteristics and information about—is representative of the overall market. For example, at 
                                                 
2 While we are aware that this is a somewhat imprecise measure, to our knowledge the data that detail the 
geographic distribution of employees for each company during the sample period are not available. Moreover, most 
value-relevant, strategically important information is likely concentrated at the company headquarters.   6  
the end of 1991 the “market” consists of 5,478 stocks that cover 89% of the overall market 
capitalization at the time. 
In most of our empirical analyses, we relate the industry composition of a household’s 
purchases during a quarter to the industry composition of all the purchases of the household’s 
neighbors (households located within 50 miles) made during the quarter, plus appropriate 
controls. We choose this distance because there is evidence that 50 miles captures most of one’s 
social interactions, including those that are employment-based.
3 
The sample size necessitates two adjustments. First, instead of fitting regressions based 
on individual stocks we aggregate all the buys in each quarter by assigning firms to one of the 
following 14 industry groups based on their SIC code:  mining, oil and gas, construction, food, 
basic materials, medical/biotechnology, manufacturing, transportation, telecommunications, 
utilities, retail/wholesale trade, finance, technology, and services. Moreover, although 35,673 
households purchased common stocks at some point during the sample period, in each quarter 
we consider only the households that made some purchases during the quarter. In sum, there are 
23 complete quarters in the sample period (1991:1 to 1996:3), 14 industries, and 7,000 to 9,000 
households that made purchases in a quarter. This leads to a total of 2,678,004 observations, 
where each observation has several control variables, as well as 322 industry-quarter dummy 
variables (14 industries x 23 quarters). 
B. Summary Statistics 
Table I summarizes quarterly household stock purchases at the industry level. Summary 
statistics are reported for the entire sample period (bottom row of the table) as well as annually. 
The first column presents the number of household, quarter, industry (h, t, i) combinations in a 
given year for which household h made at least one purchase in quarter t in industry i. The 
second column tallies the number of distinct households appearing in the sample in a given year. 
The third column lists average dollar values of households’ quarterly purchases, where median 
values are reported in parentheses directly underneath the mean values. The last two columns 
break down the purchases according to their distances from the household (i.e., whether the firm 
headquarters is located within 50 miles of the household) and their S&P 500 status. There are a 
                                                 
3 For example, according to the 1990 Census, 88% of the population lives within 25 miles of work (98% live within 
50 miles). Moreover, if two co-workers each live only 25 miles from work, they may live as many as 50 miles apart.   7  
total of 191,286 “purchases”—household-quarter-industry (h, t, i) combinations for which there 
was a purchase by household h in quarter t in industry i—with 16,000-20,000 households making 
purchases each year, for a total of 35,673 distinct households throughout the sample period. The 
distribution of the dollar values of quarterly purchases is skewed; while the mean quarterly 
purchase was around $29,000, the median value was substantially smaller, around $8,000. The 
fourth column shows individual investors’ disproportionate preference for local stocks (17.1% of 
all purchases), a phenomenon studied in Ivković and Weisbenner (2004) and Zhu (2002). 
 
II. Information Diffusion Effects: Basic Results 
A. Basic Regression Specification 
At the outset, we classify individual stock purchases made by household h in quarter t 
into industries i = 1, 2, … , 14 and compute the dollar-weighted share of a household’s buys in 
each industry (fh,t,i).
4 In various analyses, the aggregation into 14 industries is done across all 
stock purchases, local purchases only, and non-local purchases only. Moreover, for each 
household h and each quarter t we also compute  50
, , i t h F− , i = 1, 2, … , 14, that is, the proportion 
of buys made by all neighboring households within 50 miles from household h (excluding 
household h) in each of the 14 industries. For presentational convenience, throughout the paper 
the household industry shares fh,t,i are expressed in percentage points (that is, they are multiplied 
by 100), whereas neighboring household industry shares are not. Finally, we employ industry-
quarter effects to allow for market-wide variation in demand across industries and time by 
defining 322 dummy variables Dt,i, t = 1, …, 23 (from quarter 1991:1 to 1996:3), and i = 1, 2, … 
, 14. These controls ensure that our results are not driven by, for example, technology stocks 
beating analysts’ expectations, which belong to the common information set that may affect 
buying patterns of all investors, but rather reflect the differences in households’ propensity to 
purchase technology stocks across different communities. In sum, the basic regression is: 
  i t h
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4 Note that, by construction, for every h and every t,  Σi=1, …,14 fh,t,i  = 100.   8  
For the basic specification without other controls, the null hypothesis is that information 
diffusion effects (“neighborhood effects”) do not exist, that is, that the coefficient β is zero. A 
positive β would be suggestive of the presence of the information diffusion effect. 
We next address the correlation structure of the error term: observations are independent 
neither within each household-quarter combination (industry shares necessarily need to add up to 
one) nor across time (households’ preferences are unlikely to change at quarterly frequency). It 
follows that the OLS regression estimation, although consistent, would produce biased standard 
errors. Thus, we report the standard errors and resulting tests of statistical significance that stem 
from employing a robust estimator that clusters observations at the household level for all 
regressions. 
There are several reasons why individuals’ investment choices might be related to those 
made by their neighbors. At the outset, we note that individual investors might be reacting to the 
same publicly available information to which their neighbors are reacting. Such tendencies may 
cause correlated trading. Indeed, Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2003) document that trading patterns 
are correlated across individual investors and Barber and Odean (2002) find that individual 
investors are inclined to buy stocks that attract attention. These correlated trading patterns are not 
necessarily surprising in light of exposure to (the same) publicly available information, as well as 
to the pronounced presence of the disposition effect (Odean, 1998), tax-motivated trading, and/or 
other behavioral phenomena that might prevail among individual investors, yet need not be 
driven by information diffusion effects. Our basic set of 322 industry-quarter dummy variables 
seeks to control for these and other trading factors that do not vary across communities (e.g., 
when a stock price reaches an all-time high, it does so for all investors) and thereby to allow our 
specifications to pick up information diffusion effects. 
Results of running the basic regression, without any controls other than the 322 industry-
quarter dummies, are summarized in Figure 1. It presents both the results for the pooled data 
across all 23 quarters and quarter-by-quarter results (in which case each regression only has 14 
dummy variables for the industry effects). The estimated coefficient β is highly statistically 
significant in all twenty-four regressions. Overall, information diffusion effects appear to be 
strong. For pooled observations, the estimate of 20.7% suggests that a 10% change in the 
neighbors’ allocation of purchases in an industry is associated with a nearly 2.1% change in the 
household’s own allocation of purchases in the industry. Quarterly regressions suggest that,   9  
although point estimates vary somewhat from quarter to quarter (from 13.6 to 28.3), information 
diffusion effects are strong throughout the sample period. 
B. Information Diffusion Effects for Local and Non-Local Purchases 
As discussed in the introduction, information diffusion that prevails among local and 
non-local stocks may be different. Similarity in preferences, the structure of the local industry, 
and word-of-mouth effects are likely stronger among local investments. This inquiry is also 
motivated by studies of local bias among both institutional investors (Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999)) and individual investors (Ivković and Weisbenner (2004) and Zhu (2002)). Those studies 
find that both groups of investors are biased toward holding disproportionately more local stocks 
in their portfolios. Moreover, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Ivković and Weisbenner (2004) 
present evidence that local investments outperformed non-local ones among mutual fund 
managers and individual investors, respectively. 
  We present the results of testing this hypothesis by fitting the regression from Equation 
(2) for various dependent variables in Table II. Panel A focuses on the entire universe of stocks, 
whereas Panels B and C presents results only for S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 stocks, 
respectively. Within each panel every row pertains to a different left hand side variable. The first 
row pertains to the industry share breakdown fh,t,i computed across all buys and the next two 
rows pertain to the industry composition breakdowns computed across local purchases
5 only and 
non-local purchases only, respectively. 
 The  coefficient  β reported in Panel A for all buys is 20.7, an estimate already presented in 
Figure 1. Separate consideration of local and non-local buys reported in the next two rows 
reveals that the local information diffusion effect is an order of magnitude larger than the non-
local one (119.3 vs. 8.4). For example, if the neighborhood’s allocation of local purchases to a 
particular industry increases by ten percentage points, a household tends to increase its own 
allocation of local purchases to the industry by a comparable amount. This result adds another 
dimension to the (already documented) high degrees of individual investors’ locality, both in the 
U.S. (Ivković and Weisbenner (2004), Zhu (2002)) and abroad (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), 
                                                 
5 In the regressions for local buys we discarded all the h,t,i observations for which there were no firms in industry i 
within 50 miles from household h in quarter t because the household simply could not invest into industry i locally.   10  
Massa and Simonov (2003)). The results presented herein suggest the possibility that strong 
information diffusion effects could contribute to individual investors’ local bias. 
Panels B and C address the degree of informational asymmetry between well-known 
stocks of established companies and relatively obscure stocks. We use a simple proxy—
membership in the S&P 500 index—to differentiate between the two. A comparison of Panels B 
and C with Panel A suggests that the overall pattern of information diffusion coefficients is 
preserved among both S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 stocks. The magnitudes of the coefficients in 
the two panels suggests that both local and non-local information diffusion may be somewhat 
more pronounced among S&P 500 stocks (Panel B) than among non-S&P 500 stocks. 
An issue of potential concern for local information diffusion is the possibility that the 
effect may be driven by some form of inside trading: those who work for a company may be 
trading in their own company stock and may be selectively releasing pertinent information to 
their close friends and relatives. We regard this effect as somewhat distinct from the other 
aspects of information diffusion because the information the investors would receive is likely 
much more precise than the information available through word-of-mouth effects, exposure to 
local news, influence of company’s presence through advertising efforts, company-sponsored 
events, or social interaction with company employees. 
Unfortunately, the data set does not provide information about the investors’ current and 
past employers. Consequently, it is impossible to identify whether (and to what extent) 
households hold their employers’ stocks. Still, we can control for the own-company stock 
explanation by focusing on the plausible, but rather conservative assumption that, if a 
household’s local purchase is motivated by inside information, it is likely to be the household’s 
largest local trade in that quarter. Pursuant to that assumption, we compute for each household h 
in quarter t the industry composition of local purchases excluding the single largest stock 
purchase made by household h in quarter t. In unreported analyses, we find that this specification 
yields estimates of the local information diffusion effect that are even somewhat larger than the 
estimates based on the full sample of local investments (152.5 versus 119.3) and conclude that 
we do not find evidence that trading in own-company stock drives the estimated information 
diffusion effects among local investments. 
Another issue of potential concern is that the estimates of local information diffusion may 
be induced by the dominant presence of a company (or industry) in a household’s neighborhood.   11  
Taking a drastic example, suppose there is only one company (or multiple companies all 
belonging to the same industry) local to the household. The opportunity set for local investments 
is therefore very focused and the inability to invest locally into any other industry may bias the 
results. To assess the impact of industry dominance in the local opportunity set we run 
regressions for local purchases while removing certain observations. In unreported results, we 
consider a subsample of purchases—household-quarter-industry (h,t,i) combinations for which 
the weight of industry i in the portfolio of firms local to household h does not exceed the 
threshold of 50%, that is, the observations not plagued by the domination of a single company 
(or industry) in the community. The regression coefficient remains essentially the same; it 
declines only very slightly, from 119.3 to 111.3, which suggests that the “one-company town” 
issue does not drive local information diffusion.  
III. Dissipation of Information Diffusion Effects Across Time and Space and 
the Role of Location 
A. Lags in Information Diffusion Effects 
The analyses to this point focused on the contemporaneous relations between households’ 
purchases and purchases made by their neighbors (households within 50 miles from the 
household). However, individuals may be influenced by their neighbors’ past stock trades as 
well. Accordingly, we reflect this possibility by considering specifications that allow for lags of 
up to four quarters. Unlike regressions reported to this point, in which market-wide demand for 
stocks in particular industries over time was absorbed by industry-quarter dummy variables, we 
now explicitly compute for each household h and quarter t the share of stock purchases across 
industries for all households except household h in quarter t,  All




















, , , , 0
50




− − − − −         (3) 
Table III presents results of running four specifications with varying explanatory 
variables: contemporaneous only in the first column, lagged by one quarter only in the second   12  
column, both contemporaneous and lagged by one quarter in the third column, and both 
contemporaneous and lagged by up to four quarters in the fourth column. Column (1) replicates 
the basic result from Table II with a slightly different way of controlling for market-wide 
demand for stocks at the industry level; the estimate of the contemporaneous information 
diffusion coefficient (22.1) is very close to the baseline estimate from Table II (20.7). Column 
(2) allows only for independent variables lagged by one quarter; the point estimates are very 
similar to those reported in column (1), suggesting that even a very conservative specification 
that captures information diffusion by relating current household purchases to their neighbors’ 
past purchases at the industry level uncovers a strong effect. Allowing both contemporaneous 
effects and effects with a one-quarter lag, as suggested by column (3), shows that both 
contemporaneous and lagged purchasing decisions made by a household’s neighborhood are 
related to the household’s current purchasing decisions. While the coefficient estimates are 
somewhat attenuated relative to those reported in columns (1) and (2), both are still fairly large 
(16.5 and 14.0, respectively). On the other hand, coefficients related to purchases made by all 
households differ considerably: the current quarter’s coefficient is four times larger than the 
lagged quarter’s (42.9 vs. 9.4). Finally, column (4) suggests that information diffusion effects 
extend beyond a single lagged quarter: regression coefficients pertaining to lagged purchases 
made by the households’ neighborhoods persist for all four lagged quarters and amount to a total 
of 41.2. Thus, individual investors appear not to be influenced only by their neighbors’ most 
recent purchases; rather, they are influenced by the neighbors’ purchases made across an 
extended period of time—up to one year (four quarters). 
By contrast, in this specification only contemporaneous purchases made by all 
households have a consistently strong effect (coefficient estimate of 40.4), reflecting perhaps the 
impact of current national news. Lagged coefficients vary in sign and are much smaller in 
magnitude and, moreover, an F-test rejects their joint significance at the one-percent level. It 
appears that, although lagged market-wide news may have affected trading when it first became 
available, it no longer impacts current trading. 
B. Dissipation of Information Diffusion Effects with Distance from the Household 
One would expect information diffusion effects to dissipate as the distance from the 
household increases. For example, households located more than 100 miles away from a   13  
household should have weaker effect on the household’s portfolio decision than households 
located within 50 miles. To test this, we define regions surrounding the household at increasingly 
larger distances as follows: 0-50 miles, 50-70.7 miles, 70.7-86.6 miles, 86.6-100 miles, … , 
141.4-150 miles. The prevailing criterion is that these regions should cover a geographic area of 
the same size (50
2 π = 7,854 square miles). Accordingly, we run a regression similar to Equation 
(2), except, instead of having one information diffusion regressor  50
, , i t h F− , we now have nine 
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i t h F ). The results of this regression are presented graphically in Figure 2. Across all three 
panels, that is, for all buys, local buys, and non-local buys, the pattern is the same: there is a 
rapid and steady exponential decline of the information diffusion coefficients with distance from 
the household. 
C. Information Diffusion Effects and Local Population 
In this section we stratify households according to the size of the population that resides 
within 50 miles from the household. We define four categories: 0-1 million residents, 1-2.5 
million residents, 2.5-5 million residents, and more than 5 million residents (the latter includes 
households in and around New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago). Not surprisingly, the size 
of the local population and the diversity of local companies are positively related. Specifically, 
the Herfindahl index of the industry composition of firms local to the average household 
decreases from around 0.5 to around 0.2 as the population increases from 0-1 million local 
residents to more than 5 million local residents.
6 Yet, although the average number (and dollar 
amount) of quarterly purchases of local individual stocks increases from 1.4 ($13,000) to 1.7 
($22,400), the Herfindahl index of households’ local purchases across industries remains 
virtually unchanged—it drops only very slightly—as the size of the local population increases 
(from 0.99 to 0.95 for populations of 0-1 million and more than 5 million local residents, 
respectively). Thus, although residents in larger metropolitan areas have substantially more 
diverse investment opportunities and tend to invest more into local stocks, they tend to remain 
very focused in their industry allocation. This tendency is consistent with the notion that 
                                                 
6 Firms are divided into 14 industry groups. Thus, a community with equal representation across all industries would 
have a local firm Herfindahl index of 0.07.   14  
residents in more populous geographic areas might be exposed to information diffusion effects to 
a higher degree than residents in less highly populated areas are. To confirm this intuition we run 
a simple modification of the basic regression from Equation (2) on subsamples selected by the 
type of purchase (all buys, local buys, and non-local buys) wherein information diffusion effects 
are interacted with dummies representing local population size (0-1 million, 1-2.5 million, 2.5-5 
million, more than 5 million). The coefficient estimate presented in the table for a particular 
population group represents the total information diffusion effect for that group (i.e., the sum of 
the diffusion effect for the 0-1 million group and the interaction term for that particular 
population group). 
Across all three panels of Table IV the results suggest that the information diffusion 
effects increase with population size. Stronger information diffusion effects in larger 
metropolitan areas may stem from the intensified flow of investment-relevant information 
through increased availability of information sources (e.g., business-oriented magazines and 
newspapers) and advertising efforts, both of which are subject to economies of scale and are 
typically more substantial in larger metropolitan areas. 
D. Information Diffusion Effects in Large U.S. Cities 
The preceding section shows that the information diffusion effects are stronger in larger 
metropolitan areas. Still, it is entirely possible that relatively few U.S. cities could be driving this 
effect. Generally, there could be considerable heterogeneity among information diffusion effects 
in individual large cities. In the following analysis, we identify 25 large U.S. cities and collect 
the rest of investors into the 26
th “city” R (“Rest of Investors”). To explore information diffusion 
effects among households in 25 major U.S. cities we run a regression wherein we relate the share 
of purchases across industries for each household with those of the residents of the same city and 
those of the residents of all other major cities and the rest of the investors (i.e., those that do not 
reside in one of the 25 cities):  
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where the indicator function expression  ) ( c h I ∈  means that household h resides in city c. Thus, 
for a given city c, c = 1, ..., 25, (α c – β c) represents the effect of a change in industry allocation in 
city c upon households in that city relative to households that live elsewhere. This approach 
follows very closely the key specification from Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2003), with one 
exception: in light of the nature of our data (there are many more individual investors in the 
present data set than there are money managers in the sample used by Hong, Kubik, and Stein 
(2003)), rather than considering individual stocks we focus on industry-level stock purchases. 
This regression framework allows for a close comparison of information diffusion effects of 
individual investors to those prevailing among mutual fund managers.  
  Table V present results of fitting the regression from Equation (4). The first two columns 
focus on all buys. While there is some variation in the information diffusion coefficients αc 
(related to a household’s own city), they are all fairly large and are each much larger than the 
corresponding information diffusion coefficients βc (related to other cities).  For example, the 
information diffusion coefficients of 40.4 and 8.4 for Los Angeles, respectively, mean that a 10 
percentage point increase in the portfolio share of Los Angeles’ households allocated to, for 
example, technology, will boost the technology share of a Los Angeles resident by 4%, but will 
only boost the technology share of a household’s purchases in another city by 0.8%. In fact, the 
weighted-average difference between the two information diffusion coefficients, that is, (α c – 
β c), across the twenty-five cities is 35%. That is, a ten percentage-point change in industry 
allocation in a particular city will tilt the purchases made in that industry by 3.5 percentage 
points more for a household residing in that city than for a household residing elsewhere. The 
next two pairs of columns replicate the same analysis for local purchases and non-local 
purchases. Except for a difference in the magnitude of the effect—the information diffusion from 
a household’s city is much larger for local purchases than for non-local purchases and the 
difference between the own-city effect and the other-city effect is much larger for local 
purchases than for non-local purchases (97.9 and 10.9, respectively)—the same conclusion 
holds. Overall, we present evidence of a strong dominance of the own-city effect over the other-
city effect and our results are consistent with, and somewhat more pronounced than, those 
pertaining to mutual fund managers (Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2003)). For example, while our 
basic specification yields the estimate of 35%, the comparable specification in Hong, Kubik, and 
Stein (Table 2, 2003) yields a coefficient of 22%.   16  
IV. Heterogeneity of Information Diffusion Effects and Their Relation to 
Future Industry-Level Returns 
A. Heterogeneity of Information Diffusion Effects Across Industries 
In the following analyses, carried out separately for each industry on the subsamples of 
all buys, local buys and non-local, we fit two specifications. The first specification employed for 
each industry is very similar to the baseline specification, outlined in Equation (2), with only 23 
quarter-dummies and without any additional controls. In the second specification we include 15 
controls that capture household investment style
7 to answer the question whether, after 
controlling for a household’s preference to invest, for example, in high-momentum, small, low 
book-to-market firms, the neighborhood’s allocation of purchases across industries still 
influences the household’s own allocation. Put differently, a household’s propensity to buy 
technology stocks could be driven by its neighborhood’s propensity to buy technology stocks 
and/or by the household’s preference for firms that exhibit characteristics that are correlated with 
characteristics of technology stocks; this analysis seeks to disentangle these two potentially 
conflicting effects. 
  The results are presented in Table VI. The first column shows the results of fitting the 
first, baseline specification. It suggests that there are differences among the information diffusion 
estimates obtained industry-by-industry, with the largest, statistically significant estimates for 
technology stocks, followed by retail trade and services. With the exception of all buys of 
construction stocks, coefficient estimates for both all buys and local buys are positive and 
statistically significant. As for non-local buys, the information diffusion coefficient β in the 
baseline specification is statistically significant for 10 out of the 14 industries. Moreover, the 
information diffusion effects appear to be much stronger for local buys than for non-local buys, 
for some industries even in excess of an order of magnitude. Although the 15 style dummies 
                                                 
7 Each of the household’s individual stock purchases is characterized by the stock’s size, book-to-market, and past 
year’s return. The three characteristics are sorted in each quarterly cross-section and divided into quintiles. Each 
stock purchase is associated with 15 auxiliary variables. The first five auxiliary variables are set to one if the stock 
belongs to the respective size quintile and to zero otherwise; the next five are defined analogously for stock’s book-
to-market ratio; the last five auxiliary variables are defined analogously for stock’s recent performance over the 11 
months preceding the month of purchase. The fifteen controls are computed as weighted sums of the respective 
fifteen auxiliary variables across all the purchases made by the household in the quarter and thus represent the share 
of quarterly purchases in each size, book-to-market, and momentum quintile. This approach is also employed by 
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2003).   17  
have significant explanatory power of their own, their inclusion in the specification seems to 
have had virtually no effect on the information diffusion coefficient; most of the regression 
coefficients are very similar to those reported in the respective columns for the baseline 
specification. 
B. Time-Variability of Industry-Level Information Diffusion Effects 
The industry-by-industry regressions reported in Table VI suggest some degree of 
heterogeneity among industries with respect to the intensity of information diffusion effects. 
Table VII provides summary statistics obtained by running industry-by-industry regressions 
separately for each of the 23 quarters, for a total of 322 estimates. Results for all buys, local 
buys, and non-local buys suggest that there is nontrivial time variation in the magnitude of the 
information diffusion effect point estimates. Technology stocks feature the largest average of 
point estimates for all buys and non-local buys and the second largest for local buys. In all three 
cases, their interquartile range is fairly tight. Several other industries, such as 
medical/biotechnology, retail trade, and services also had fairly large averages, whereas some 
other industries are interesting because they featured low averages for all buys and non-local 
buys, yet had high averages for local buys (e.g., oil and gas, construction, and food). The last row 
of Table VII reports the summary statistics taken across all 322 estimates of the information 
diffusion coefficient β. Roughly speaking, it suggests that the effect for all buys is an order of 
magnitude smaller than it is for local buys (average coefficient estimates are 8.9 and 97.2, 
respectively) and is more than twice as large as it is for non-local buys (average coefficient for 
non-local buys is 3.7).  
C. Do Diffusion Effects Predict Future Returns? The Portfolio Formation Approach 
In light of strong information diffusion effects, that is, evidence of correlated trading 
behavior across industry-level purchases, we next explore whether our estimates of information 
diffusion can predict industry-level returns. Intuitively, our inquiry may be interpreted as a 
simple question as to whether industry-level diffusion effects among individual investors can 
create sufficiently concentrated trades and thus “momentum” to impact future industry-level 
returns?    18  
In this section we implement a simple portfolio formation strategy wherein at the end of 
each quarter t the fourteen industries are sorted according to their information diffusion estimates 
i t D I , ˆ . The industries are then classified into three categories: top five, bottom five, and middle 
four. This classification serves as the basis for forming a zero-cost portfolio. The returns to the 
long (short) size of the portfolio are equally-weighted returns to the top (bottom) five industries. 
These positions can be held during the next quarter only, in which case the portfolio is 
completely redefined each quarter, or over a longer horizon of one year. In the latter case, the 
overall portfolio consists of four sub-portfolios, all of which are equally weighted, and only one-
fourth of the portfolio is modified each quarter. Finally, in light of highest estimates of 
information diffusion effects among technology stocks, we introduce a robustness check wherein 
we remove technology stocks from the long side of the portfolio in all quarters in which it would 
be classified among the top five industries (which occurs in most quarters). This entire procedure 
is carried out for estimates of information diffusion among all buys, local buys, and non-local 
buys. We control for risk using the four-factor model (i.e., the three Fama-French (1993) factors 
and the fourth momentum factor) proposed by Carhart (1997). 
The results of analyzing the performance of these zero-cost portfolios are presented in 
Table VIII. The table presents the loadings on the four factors and the risk-adjusted performance 
(Alpha) for each of the nine portfolios. Moreover, the bottom row of the table presents raw 
returns on each of the zero-cost portfolios. The bottom two rows suggest that the risk-adjusted 
returns are positive for all portfolios, although Alpha is consistently statistically significant only 
across the portfolio strategies based on non-local diffusion. Those analyses suggest that chasing 
information diffusion effects concerning non-local industry-level purchases in the sample would 
have resulted in abnormal portfolio performance of around seven percentage points per year 
(under the assumption of quarterly rebalancing), both including and excluding the technology 
industry. As suggested by the high p-value of the four-factor model regressions with the 3-month 
holding period, there is no systematic difference in the two portfolios formed on non-local 
diffusion (i.e., no difference in loadings on the four factors). The effect of non-local information 
diffusion appears to weaken fairly quickly, as the estimate related to the 12-month holding 
period (involving up to four equally-weighted overlapping sub-portfolios), aside from being only 
marginally statistically significant, is reduced by one-half in comparison with the quarterly 
rebalancing strategy.  19  
D. Alternative Perspective: The Industry-Level Panel Data Approach 
As a robustness check to the strong returns following high non-local information 
diffusion, we relate industry-level returns prevailing over the next period not only to current 
information diffusion effects, but also to industries’ current performance, individual investors’ 
demand for stocks at the industry level, as well industry and quarter effects. The regression at the 













, , , , 1 ˆ ε + δ + γ + β + β + β = ∑∑
==
+ ,                    (5) 
where the first regressor is the quarterly industry-level non-local information diffusion estimate, 
the second regressor represents lagged industry-level returns, the third regressor captures 
industry-level demand,  and the remaining regressors are controls for industry and quarter 
effects. The industry-level demand is computed as the difference between buys and sells of stock 
in the given industry divided by their sum: BSIt,i = ($Buyst,i – $Sellst,i)/ ($Buyst,i + $Sellst,i). This 
approach follows Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992). The annual regression differs only in 
regard to the horizon of future industry-level returns (i.e., the left-hand-side variable)—those 
returns stretch across the next four quarters. 
  Panel A of Table IX presents results for the regression involving quarterly industry-level 
returns. Each of the three specifications introduces increasingly more controls, culminating in 
column (3) that features the full set of control variables from Equation (5). Information diffusion 
effects of non-local purchases are consistently (though marginally) statistically significant across 
all of the specifications. The impact of non-local diffusion is economically significant: the point 
estimate of 0.08 and the interquartile range of quarter-industry non-local information diffusion 
effect from the last row of Table VII (–1.4 to 7.3) suggest that a change in the information 
diffusion effect for an industry equal to the interquartile range (that is, around 8.7) is associated 
with a 70 basis points increase in next quarter’s returns for the industry (which translates into 
approximately 2.8% per year). Similarly, results from column (3) in Panel B suggest a 2.0% 
increase in annual industry level returns (8.7 * 0.23), although the evidence is only marginally 
statistically significant. In sum, controlling for the pattern of buying/selling activity, non-local 
information diffusion effects have predictive power for future industry-level returns.   20  
E. Toward Understanding the Predictive Power of Non-Local Industry-Level Information 
Diffusion Effects 
 
  The analyses presented in Tables VIII and IX offer compelling evidence that industry-
level non-local information diffusion can predict industry-level returns, where the magnitude of 
the effect is estimated to lie in the range from two to seven percentage points per year. In this 
section we offer an insight into a plausible mechanism that might generate such a pattern. 
Empirical evidence is mounting that individual investors are able to exploit informational 
asymmetries embedded in stocks local to them (Ivković and Weisbenner (2004)).
8 Consistent 
with such evidence, we show that individual investors’ purchases of local stocks outperform their 
purchases of non-local stocks (Panel A in Table X). This finding suggests that a certain fraction 
of “good” value-relevant information is generated locally. 
Second, local information diffusion effects are statistically significantly related to both 
contemporaneous and future (by up to three quarters) non-local diffusion effects, but not to 
lagged non-local diffusion effects. Specifically, the correlation between local “word-of-mouth” 
effects and contemporaneous non-local “word-of-mouth” effects is 0.11 and is statistically 
significant; the correlation between local effects and future non-local effects remains strong and 
statistically significant for the next three quarters (the correlations are 0.17, 0.12, and 0.10, 
respectively). Put differently, an intense flow of investment information started locally continues 
non-locally for quite a while and non-locals may be enticed to buy those stocks about which they 
(eventually) receive some information. 
Panel B of Table X provides evidence that, consistent with the disposition effect 
documented in Odean (1998), investors tend to sell local stocks too soon—local purchases 
continue to outperform non-local purchases following their sale (the differential in terms of both 
raw returns and risk-adjusted returns is positive, yet it lacks statistically significance for risk-
adjusted returns). Non-locals, on the other hand, being net buyers of stocks previously (and 
perhaps concurrently) sold by locals, may still reap some benefits from the original “good” 
value-relevant information generated locally. 
                                                 
8 Similarly, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that professional managers’ local investments outperform their non-
local investments.   21  
V. Disentangling Information Diffusion Effects 
The results presented in Section II suggest that the stock purchases made by households 
are strongly related to those made by their neighbors, consistent with word-of-mouth effects 
playing a strong role in household investment decisions. However, such a correlation in trading 
activity could also reflect an underlying similarity in preferences and/or the industry-composition 
of local firms. In regard to U.S. investors, studies have found correlated trading patterns both for 
institutional investors (Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2003)) and individual investors (Barber, Odean, 
and Zhu (2003)), but have not explored why such correlated trading patterns obtain. To our 
knowledge, the only study that addresses this issue focuses on individual investors in the 
People’s Republic of China (Feng and Seasholes (2004)) and finds that correlated trading is 
related to the flow of local information, but is not related to word-of-mouth effects that could 
result from executing trades in the same branch office. 
Unlike Feng and Seasholes (2004), we do not have what is essentially a natural 
experiment—the investors in our sample can place trades by phone, over the Internet, or in 
person, rather than being required to place trades in the specific brokerage house in which they 
opened an account. Instead, we devise an alternative strategy to disentangle the sources of the 
observed correlation between a household’s stock purchases and those of its neighbors. In 
particular, we consider three key contributions to the overall information diffusion effect, 
namely, word-of-mouth communication, correlated preferences (which may incorporate common 
reaction to news events), and the structure of the local economy. 
We use the composition of the neighborhoods’ aggregate portfolio to reveal the 
neighborhoods’ preferences and the accumulation of their reactions to past news. Analogously, 
we use the composition of a household’s own portfolio position to reveal its own preferences and 
accumulated reactions to past news. We further use the degree of conformity of the household 
portfolio composition to the portfolio composition of the neighborhood to identify households 
with preferences and reactions similar to their neighbors’, as well as those whose preferences and 
reactions are very different from their neighbors’. 
Upon controlling for the composition of households’ neighborhood portfolios and 
households’ own portfolio compositions, as well as the structure of the local economy, we view   22  
the correlation between the household’s stock purchases and those of its neighbors that survives 
such rigid controls as a conservative lower bound on the magnitude of the word-of-mouth effect. 
Strikingly, our estimates of the contribution of word-of-mouth communication are very similar 
across households that conformed to their neighbors very closely and those that held very 
disparate portfolios. This finding is reassuring because it suggests that the strategy we employed 
to control for the effect of common preferences and the cumulative common reactions to news 
did not lead to materially different estimates of the word-of-mouth effect across the two sets of 
households. 
It is important to differentiate among these competing sources of the overall information 
diffusion effect because they likely have different levels of influence on the market. For 
example, word-of-mouth effects may create a more dynamic exchange of information that may 
lead to a ripple effect of further information dissemination, which in turn may have an impact on 
stock prices. 
A. The Role of Correlated Preferences 
  A potential source of correlated purchases among households in a geographic area is that 
these households may have similar preferences. Individual investors might be influenced by their 
neighbors’ investment choices because they wish to conform and keep pace with their neighbors’ 
wealth and investment habits (Bernheim (1994), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Shore and 
White (2003)). Moreover, to the extent that individuals choose their place of residence according 
to their preferences, and those tend to be correlated among the residents of the same geographic 
area, it is possible that similar tastes might govern investment decisions even without explicit 
communication with their neighbors. Finally, it is plausible that individual investors’ own 
preferences are correlated over time; individuals might have an inclination to conform to some of 
their previous investment choices (to the extent of favoring stocks from the same industry as they 
previously did). 
  To explore the effect of correlated preferences, we define two variables for each (h, t) 
observation. First, we define the industry composition of stock positions of neighboring 
households (excluding household h itself) at the end of quarter t-1. Second, we define the 
industry composition of stock positions of the household itself at the end of quarter t-1. The 
inclusion of these two position-related variables in the specification explicitly accounts for any   23  
underlying correlation in trading activity attributable to a similarity in preferences within a 
community that manifests itself in a similarity of stock purchases within the community or a 
similarity in an individual’s own stock preferences over time. This approach requires merging 
purchases in quarter t with positions at the end of quarter t-1. While there is substantial overlap 
between household identifiers for trades and positions in the database, the matching is imperfect 
and it allowed us to retain around two-thirds of the original observations used in previous 
analyses. 
B. The Structure of the Local Economy 
Companies routinely seek to generate a certain presence in the local community. One 
immediate effect of such endeavors is investors’ enhanced familiarity with local companies, 
generated through social interaction with employees and company efforts such as local 
advertising and sponsoring local events. Investors’ propensity to invest in the companies 
(industries) they are familiar with, and perhaps even informed about, undoubtedly constitutes one 
important facet of information diffusion. Moreover, the local presence of a company may 
enhance the probability of circulation of very precise, inside information, an issue we addressed 
to a certain extent in Section II.  
To capture the impact of the structure of the local economy, we define variables that 
capture the distribution of the local economy and local labor force across industries. Specifically, 
for each (h, t, i) observation we define two variables: the fraction of market value of companies 
local to household h in quarter t in industry i and the fraction of the labor force local to 
household h in quarter t employed in industry i.
9 
Including these two variables should pick up both the effects that stem from familiarity 
with local companies and the potential direct company-stock effect. For example, if there are 
many employees working for construction companies in the area, a household’s propensity to 
invest in construction firms could stem from word-of-mouth effects—social interaction between 
these employees and other households—and/or these employees investing in their own company 
stock (company-stock effects). 
                                                 
9 We obtain the number of employees from COMPUSTAT. For the purpose of this analysis we assume that all the 
company’s employees are employed in the same county in which the company headquarters are located. We are 
aware that this is a somewhat imprecise measure, but, to our knowledge, more precise panel data regarding the 
geographic distribution of the employees for each company are not available.   24  
Figure 3 presents average compositions of quarterly buys, firms local to the household, 
and corporate workers local to the household over the entire sample period. The figure shows 
that the purchases made by the individual investors in the sample were tilted toward technology 
and medical/biotechnology industries: around one-third of all purchases were in technology 
stocks and a further one-sixth in medical/biotechnology stocks. Moreover, the figure suggests 
that there may be a relatively high correlation between the composition of individuals’ purchases 
and the local economy, that is, market values and corporate workers in the individuals’ 
neighborhoods (within 50 miles). 
Industry compositions of households’ total buys are more correlated with their neighbors’ 
buys (0.34) than they are with either market values of local firms (0.15) or employees of local 
firms (0.16). There is a striking contrast in the effect that local firms have on households’ local 
buys versus households’ non-local buys. Specifically, the correlation between the industry 
composition of local firm value (employees) and the industry composition of local buys is 0.41 
(0.40), while the comparable correlation for non-local buys is 0.10 (0.11). The higher 
correlations related to local buys could partially reflect company-stock issues, namely, the 
propensity to invest in a firm for which household members work (or have worked). On the other 
hand, the correlations related to non-local buys likely do not reflect this concern; instead, they 
likely reflect the fact that households’ familiarity with local investment opportunities influences 
households’ remote investments as well. 
C. The Results 
The results of relating the industry composition of a household’s investments to the 
neighborhood’s preferences, own preferences, and the structure of the local economy are 
presented in Table XI. Panel A has three sections, containing estimates for all buys, local buys, 
and non-local buys, respectively. Within each section, we first show the baseline result, which 
corresponds very closely with the corresponding baseline result in Table II, Panel A.
10 The 
following row in each section shows the results with the two additional independent variables 
that seek to capture preferences for industry allocation. Both variables are statistically 
significant, which suggests that households’ purchases across industries are related to the 
                                                 
10 The small discrepancies between the point estimates (e.g., 19.9 in Table XI vs. 20.7 in Table II for all buys) can 
be attributed to the differing numbers of observations.   25  
common preferences that prevail in their neighborhoods, as well as their own revealed 
preferences (as described by their current common-stock positions). For example, the point 
estimates suggest that households that enter the quarter with a stock portfolio fully concentrated 
in a particular industry allocate 31-48 percentage points more of their quarterly purchases to that 
same industry.  The point estimate of β, interpreted as the information diffusion effect unrelated 
to such preferences or the word-of-mouth component, is equal to one-half of the magnitude of 
the estimated effect of the overall information diffusion (Table II, Panel A) for all buys and non-
local buys, and to one-third for local buys.  
  The third row in each section of Panel A includes the variables that capture the structure 
of the local economy. Both local-economy variables are positively related to the allocation of 
household purchases across industries and are statistically significant, although they tend to 
attenuate the estimate of β to a much lesser degree than do the two variables related to 
preferences. Although the effect of the structure of the local economy is present for all the 
subsamples, the impact is by far the strongest for local buys. Specifically, a 10 percentage point 
change in the presence of a certain industry (as measured by firm values) is associated with a 4.7 
percentage point change in the allocation of a local household’s local purchases across industries. 
The impact of the industry-level structure of the local labor force is also noticeable (1.4 
percentage point change), though it is not as strong. 
The fourth row in each section features the results of relating the industry composition of 
a household’s investments to both preferences (the neighborhood’s and own) and the structure of 
the local economy. Estimates of the effects of all the four variables are positive and statistically 
significant. Most importantly, the point estimate of β, interpreted as the information diffusion 
effect unrelated to either preferences or the structure of the local economy, approximately equals 
one-half of the magnitude of the estimated effect of the overall information diffusion for all buys 
and non-local buys, and one-third for local buys. Figure 4 illustrates the estimates of the overall 
information diffusion effect for all buys (as presented in Figure 1), plotted using gray bars, and 
the word-of-mouth component for all buys, plotted using black bars. The estimates for the full 
sample period are plotted using full bars, whereas quarterly estimates are plotted using dotted 
bars. For the full sample, word-of-mouth communication accounts for nearly one-half of the 
overall information diffusion effect. This is a very robust estimate because inspection of period-  26  
by-period estimates suggests that word-of-mouth communication accounts for 40% to 50% of the 
overall information diffusion effect in most quarters.  
The final analysis reported in Panel A of Table XI seeks to capture differences among 
households along unobservable characteristics by running the baseline regression from Equation 
(2) with the inclusion of household-level fixed effects. This is a very rigorous test, as it presents 
a higher standard than the baseline specification: it relates the change in a household’s allocation 
of purchases to an industry from its time-series average allocation of purchases to the industry 
with the change in its neighborhood’s allocation of purchases to the industry from the 
neighborhood’s time series average allocation of purchases to the industry. For example, an 
investor who likes technology stocks may happen to live in an area where others independently 
also happen to invest in technology stocks. Such a non-causal correlation would lead toward the 
detection of diffusion effects in a cross-sectional regression even if investors acted 
independently. By contrast, to identify diffusion effects in a panel regression requires that, in 
response to a change in community technology stock investment, the household should change 
its allocation to technology stocks in the same direction. Results in the last row of each section in 
Panel A are compelling; they suggest that information diffusion effects remain strong in the 
household fixed-effects framework, especially for local buys (3.6 for all buys; 17.7 for the 
subsample of local buys; 2.4 for the subsample of non-local buys), though the magnitudes are 
substantially reduced compared to the cross-sectional analyses. 
  The extent to which households’ portfolios conform to those of their neighbors can serve 
as a proxy for identifying households whose purchasing decisions are driven to varying degrees 
by the desire to adhere (inadvertently or not) to the preferences and common news prevailing in 
their neighborhood. For example, if the household shared the investment preferences with its 
neighborhood and responded to news similarly to its neighborhood, over time its portfolio 
composition would be very similar to that of its community. 
We sort households into two types according to the extent to which their household 
portfolio allocations at the industry level conform to those of their neighbors; the metric we use 
is the average absolute deviation in industry portfolio shares between a household and its 
neighborhood. Results in Panels B and C of Table XI suggest that, while initially there are 
substantial differences in information diffusion effects (i.e., coefficients associated with the 
composition of buys of neighboring households) across the two groups, once the variables that   27  
capture preferences and the structure of the local economy are included, the estimated coefficient 
β (i.e., the relation between a household’s purchases and its neighbors’ purchases) becomes fairly 
similar across the two types of investors. Specifically, the β for local (non-local) buys across the 
two groups of investors are 46.2 and 29.4 (3.9 and 2.9), respectively, and are no longer 
significantly different at the 1% level. This suggests that the two positions-related variables 
indeed are successful in capturing the effect of common preferences because, once they are 
included in the specification, the remaining information diffusion effect, which we attribute to 
word-of-mouth communication, is very comparable across investors that have stock portfolios 
very similar to their neighbors and those with portfolios that are quite different. 
Finally, we revisit the analysis that relates industry-level returns prevailing over the next 
period to current information diffusion effects and a number of controls such as industries’ 
current performance, individual investors’ demand for stocks at the industry level, as well 
industry and quarter effects. As discussed earlier, it may be important to differentiate among the 
word-of-mouth effect and other sources of correlated purchases because they likely have 
different levels of influence on the market. Toward that goal, we augment the specification from 
Equation (5) by including two components of non-local diffusion—the word-of-mouth 
component and other information diffusion (expressed as the difference between the overall 
information diffusion effect and the estimate of word-of-mouth communication):
11 The 
regression at the quarterly horizon is specified as follows: 
i t
ti













, , , , , 1 ˆ ˆ ε + δ + γ + β + β + β + β = ∑∑
==
+ ,       (6)               
where the first two regressors are the quarterly industry-level non-local information diffusion 
estimates of word-of-mouth effects (“WOM”) and other information diffusion effects (“OD”), 
and the remaining regressors are the same as in Equation (5). Once again, the annual regression 
differs only in regard to the horizon of future industry-level returns (i.e., the left-hand-side 
variable)—those returns stretch across the next four quarters. 
  Panel A of Table XII presents results for the regression involving quarterly industry-level 
returns, while Panel B presents the one-year return regression results. Disentangling the overall 
                                                 
11 The word-of-mouth component is defined as the diffusion effect that remains after controlling for preferences and 
the structure of the local economy.   28  
information diffusion effect into word-of mouth communication and other diffusion effects 
yields further insight as to how correlated trading among individuals may influence stock prices. 
The significant relation between non-local diffusion and subsequent industry-level returns 
appears to be driven by the word-of-mouth component. Across all specifications and all return 
horizons, word-of-mouth communication is predictive of higher future industry-level returns, 
while there is no significant relation between the other diffusion effects and returns. This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that word-of-mouth communication creates a more dynamic 
exchange of information that may lead to a ripple effect of further information dissemination, 
which in turn may eventually impact stock prices. 
VI. Conclusion 
Using a detailed set of common-stock investments that nearly 36,000 households made in 
the period from 1991 to 1996, we focus on the relation between the investment choices made by 
an individual investor’s neighborhood (households located within 50 miles from the investor) 
and the investor’s own investment choices. We find strong evidence of information diffusion: 
baseline estimates suggest that a ten percentage-point increase in purchases of stocks from an 
industry made by a household’s neighbors is associated with a two percentage point increase in 
the household’s own purchases of stocks from that industry, with the effect larger for local stock 
purchases.   
The findings are robust to controls for inside information effects, domination of a single 
company (industry) in the neighborhood, and household fixed effects. In sum, there is strong 
evidence that individuals’ purchasing decisions are related to those made by their neighbors. The 
strength of the information diffusion effect is compelling; for example, investors in more 
populous areas, where, on average, there are many more local investment choices, still are very 
concentrated in their purchases. To the extent that their investment choices are related to their 
neighbors’, the information diffusion effect is likely at least partially responsible for individual 
investors’ lack of diversification. 
We further find that there is considerable heterogeneity among information diffusion 
effects across industries and across time and relate these patterns in individual investors’ trading 
(i.e., quarters with high information diffusion) to future returns. We find that, even after 
controlling for aggregate individual investors’ demand (as captured by the buy-sell imbalance)   29  
and past industry-level performance, information diffusion among non-local investors predicts 
future industry-level returns: an increase in non-local information diffusion equal to the 
interquartile range of the estimates of information diffusion across 322 industry-quarter 
observations is associated with a two to three percentage point increase in industry returns over 
the following year.  
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that there is a pronounced intertemporal 
dynamic of the flow of investment-relevant information between local and non-local investors, 
wherein the value-relevant information generated locally is disseminated over time to non-local 
investors. It appears that it requires a coordinated action of non-local investors (relative to any 
location, non-local investors clearly constitute the vast majority of all investors), who act upon 
the information disseminated to them by local investors, to move the asset prices during the next 
quarter or year. We propose and present evidence consistent with a mechanism that could 
generate the predictability of industry-level returns from non-local information diffusion.    30  
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Table I:  Quarterly Purchases of Stock by Households 1/1991 – 9/1996 
Table I summarizes quarterly household stock purchases at the industry level. Summary statistics 
are reported for the entire sample period (bottom row of the table) as well as annually. The first 
column presents the number of household, quarter, industry (h, t, i) combinations in a given year 
for which household h made at least one purchase in quarter t in industry i. The second column 
tallies the number of distinct households appearing in the sample in a given year. The third 
column lists average dollar values of households’ quarterly purchases, where median values are 
reported in parentheses directly underneath the mean values. The last two columns break down 
the purchases according to their distance from the household (i.e., whether the firm headquarters 
is located within 50 miles of the household) and their S&P 500 status. 
  # Purchases # Distinct HHs
Mean Quarterly 
purchase (in $) 
[Median] 
% Local % S&P 500 
1991 36,250  20,366  23,242 
[7,113]  16.4 47.9 
1992 36,270  20,300  23,576 
[7,500]  17.0 48.7 
1993 34,377  18,894  25,150 
[7,500]  16.4 46.5 
1994 28,726  16,307  25,418 
[7,388]  17.4 43.3 
1995 30,299  16,134  38,540 




25,364 15,483  42,277 
[9,725]  17.5 43.5 
TOTAL 191,286  35,673  28,922 
[7,949]  17.1 45.8 
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Table II:  Information Diffusion and Stock Purchases, Local/Non-Local and 
S&P 500/Non-S&P 500 Breakdown, Pooled Regression 1/1991 – 9/1996 
The table presents the results of fitting the regression from Equation (2) for various dependent 
variables as follows: 
i t h
ti







, , , , covariates other  ε + + γ + β = ∑∑
==
− . 
Panel A focuses on the entire universe of stocks, whereas Panels B and C presents results only 
for S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 stocks, respectively. Within each panel, every row pertains to a 
different left hand side variable. The first row pertains to the industry share breakdown fh,t,i 
computed across all buys and the next two rows pertain to the industry composition breakdowns 
computed across local purchases
  only and non-local purchases only, respectively. In the 
regressions for local buys we discarded all the h,t,i observations for which there were no firms in 
industry i within 50 miles from household h in quarter t because the household simply could not 
invest into industry i locally. 
Sample  Composition of Buys of 
Households within 50 Miles  R
2  # Observations






  0.142 2,678,004
Local Buys  




  0.232 568,247
Non-Local Buys 




  0.129 2,337,314






  0.151 1,490,342
Local Buys  




  0.287 235,657
Non-Local Buys 




  0.138 1,327,438






  0.136 1,752,198
Local Buys  




  0.226 377,244
Non-Local Buys 




  0.122 1,479,142
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   34  
 Table III:  Lags in Information Diffusion 
This table presents results of fitting four regression specifications that allow for lags of 
information diffusion effects of up to four quarters. For the purposes of these analyses, we 
explicitly compute for each household h and quarter t the share of stock purchases across 
industries for all households except household h in quarter t,  All
i t h F , , − , i = 1, 2, … , 14, and run the 



















, , , , 0
50




− − − − −  
The four columns present results of running specifications with varying explanatory variables: 
contemporaneous only in (1), lagged by one quarter only in (2), both contemporaneous and 
lagged by one quarter in (3), and both contemporaneous and lagged by up to four quarters in (4).  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Purchases of Households  













Purchases of Households 













Purchases of Households 
within 50 miles (2 quarter lag) 





Purchases of Households 
within 50 miles (3 quarter lag) 





Purchases of Households 
within 50 miles (4 quarter lag) 




















Purchases of all Households 













Purchases of all Households 
(2 quarter lag) 





Purchases of all Households 
(3 quarter lag) 




Purchases of all Households 
(4 quarter lag) 





    
R
2  0.136 0.139 0.142 0.152 
Number of observations  2,678,004  2,570,848  2,570,848  2,170,504 
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   35  
Table IV:  Information Diffusion and Population 
This table presents results of stratifying households according to the size of the population that 
resides within 50 miles from the household into four categories and assessing information 
diffusion effects in neighborhoods of various size by running the following regression (a variant 
of Equation (2)): 
i t h
ti







, , , , * ) ( * ) ( ε + γ + β = ∑∑
==
− . 
The four categories are: 0-1 million, 1-2.5 million, 2.5-5 million, and more than 5 million 
residents (the latter includes households in and around New York City, Los Angeles, and 
Chicago). Regressions are estimated on subsamples selected by the type of purchase and 
presented in three panels accordingly (All Buys, Local Buys, and Non-Local Buys). The 
coefficient estimate presented in the table for a particular population group represents the overall 
information diffusion effect for that group (i.e., the sum of the diffusion effect for the 0-1 million 
group and the interaction term for that particular population group). 
Population (in 000s)  Composition of  
HH Buys ≤ 50 miles  R
2  # obs. 
Panel A: All Buys 












         5,000+  





Panel B: Local Buys 












         5,000+ 





Panel C: Non-Local Buys 












         5,000+ 







* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   36  
Table V:  Information Diffusion and Stock Purchases by Location 
This table reports results of exploring information diffusion effects among households in 25 
major U.S. cities. We identify 25 large U.S. cities and collect the rest of investors into the 26
th 
“city” R (“Rest of Investors”) and run a regression wherein we relate the share of purchases 
across industries for each household with those of the residents of the same city and those of the 
residents of all other major cities and the rest of the investors (i.e., those that do not reside in one 
of the 25 cities):  
i t h i t c
c
c i t h c
c











The indicator function expression  ) ( c h I ∈  means that household h resides in city c. For a given 
city c, c = 1, ..., 25, (α c – β c) represents the effect of a change in industry allocation in city c 
upon households in that city relative to households that live elsewhere. The first two columns 
focus on all buys. The weighted-average difference between the two information diffusion 
coefficients, that is, (α c – β c), is reported in the second to last row of the table. The next two pairs 
of columns replicate the same analysis for local purchases and non-local purchases.   37  
Table V: Information Diffusion and Stock Purchases by Location (continued) 
  All Buys  Local Buys  Non-Local Buys 
  Own City  Other  Own City  Other  Own City  Other 




  14.4 
***  4.1
***



























































































































  13.0 
***  4.5
***
































  -0.9 
  -1.8
** 

















2  0.183 0.313 0.139 
# observations  1,204,434 403,536  984,074 
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   38  
Table VI: Information Diffusion and Stock Purchases by Industry 
The table presents regression results based on specifications similar to Equation 2, carried out 
separately for each industry. Two specifications are fitted for each industry. The first 
specification employed for each industry is very similar to the baseline specification, outlined in 
Equation (2), with only 23 quarter-dummies and without any additional controls. In the second 
specification we include 15 style controls that capture household investment style as follows: 
t h
t




, ,     controls   style ε + + γ + β = ∑
=
− . 
The 15 style controls account for a household’s preference to invest in stocks with certain 
characteristics (for example, in high-momentum, small, low book-to-market firms). Regressions 
are fitted for samples of all buys, local buys, and non-local buys. For each of the three samples, 
the first column shows the results of fitting the first, baseline specification, and the second 
column shows the results of fitting the second specification that includes 15 style controls. 
All Buys
    Local Buys  Non-Local Buys   
Industry  Baseline   Style 
Dummies   Baseline  Style 
Dummies 
  Baseline   Style 
Dummies 
Mining 4.3 
***   4.3
***  18.7
***   20.2
***  3.2
*   3.3
** 
Oil & Gas  1.6 
**   1.6
**  92.0
***   88.3
***  0.7





***   79.3
***  -0.4
   -0.1
 
Food 3.6 
***   3.3
***  63.1
***   57.1
***  0.1
   0.0
 
Basic Materials  5.9 
***   5.7
***  63.2
***   62.4
***  2.5
**   2.4
** 
Medical/Biotech 10.4 
***   11.3
***  84.3
***   90.4
***  4.3
***   4.5
*** 
Manufacturing 6.7 
***   5.9
***  57.3
***   54.0
***  1.6
*   1.3
 
Transportation 6.1 
***   6.3
***  80.5
***   88.1
***  2.8
***   2.7
*** 
Telecom 3.7 
***   3.1
***  44.2
***   44.8
***  0.8
   0.4
 
Utilities 7.5 
***   6.4
***  88.8
***   87.7
***  5.0
***   3.9
*** 
Retail Trade  20.1 
***   19.5
***  117.4
***   117.4
***  11.7
***   11.4
*** 
Financial 7.8 
***   5.7
***  83.2
***   62.9
***  2.8
***   2.2
** 
Technology 36.7 
***   35.3
***  140.7
***   136.4
***  14.6
***   14.0
*** 
Services 13.0 
***   10.6
***  135.2
***   132.5
***  5.4




* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   39  
Table VII:  Dispersion in Quarterly Information Diffusion by Industry (1/1991 – 9/1996) 
The table presents summary statistics of regression estimates β in specifications similar to Equation 2, 
carried out for each quarter t and each industry i as follows: 
h h h F f ε + β = −
50 . 
Thus, summary statistics obtained by running industry-by-industry regressions separately for each of the 
23 quarters, for a total of 322 estimates. Regressions are fitted for all buys, local buys, and non-local 
buys, with the means, medians, and the interquartile ranges of the information diffusion coefficients 
reported for each industry (the first fourteen rows of the table). Finally, the last row of the table presents 
summary statistics across all industries, that is, across all 322 estimates of the information diffusion 
coefficient β. 






th% Mean Median 25
th – 75




Mining  3.6  0.7  -2.0 – 6.6 30.1 24.1 -12.8 – 61.9 2.5 -0.9 -2.6 – 5.3
Oil & Gas  3.1  0.2  -1.6 – 5.3 133.5 121.6 40.7 – 212.9 1.5 -0.7 -2.9 – 4.5
Construction  0.6  0.3  -2.0 – 4.2 125.0 54.0 -26.2 – 148.3 -1.5 -1.8 -4.5 – 0.2
Food  3.2  2.9  0.5 – 4.8 90.6 63.5 34.1 – 124.9 0.0 0.4 -2.1 – 2.8
Basic Materials  5.2  3.7  1.2 – 10.2 84.6 62.2 31.4 – 124.9 1.8 0.2 -2.0 – 6.4
Medical/Biotech  10.0  10.0  5.6 – 13.4 73.8 67.3 37.7 – 106.5 4.7 3.5 0.3 – 7.8
Manufacturing  7.5  6.6  5.4 – 12.1 73.1 56.7 37.8 – 105.9 2.2 1.9 -0.3 – 6.4
Transportation  5.8  3.9  0.3 – 13.0 98.0 63.4 22.1 – 155.1 2.4 1.8 -2.3 – 6.7
Telecom  3.6  2.1  -0.8 – 9.0 50.2 44.9 9.4 – 74.6 1.4 -0.7 -3.9 – 6.0
Utilities  7.1  6.0  1.1 – 13.3 90.9 72.8 19.4 – 109.9 4.6 3.8 -0.0 – 7.8
Retail Trade  16.5  12.6 11.4 – 23.1 113.1 114.1 83.7 – 131.7 8.5 6.6 4.0 – 9.8
Financial  7.9  7.4  4.1 – 11.7 92.9 105.1 58.3 – 129.4 3.0 3.0 0.1 – 4.8
Technology  36.6  36.2 33.5 – 40.8 143.7 140.6 128.3 – 152.5 14.6 14.9 11.1 – 19.1
Services  13.9  13.5  7.1 – 19.6 161.7 179.2 101.7 – 228.5 6.0 6.0 -0.9 – 10.5
All Industries  8.9  6.1  1.0 – 13.1 97.2 83.9 35.3 – 137.1 3.7  2.6 -1.4 – 7.3      4 0  
Table VIII:  Regression of Monthly Portfolio Returns 4/91 – 9/97 (in percentages), High vs. Low Diffusion Industries 
This table presents results of regressing zero-cost portfolio returns formed on the basis of estimates of industry-level quarterly 
information diffusion effects on four factors (Carhart (1997)). Each time series of monthly portfolio returns is based on equally-
weighted monthly industry returns. At the end of each quarter, industry-level information diffusion coefficients β are sorted by 
magnitude. The industries featuring the five highest coefficients (in some specifications, this group would exclude technology stocks 
if they ranked among the highest, a very common occurrence) are grouped into the “High Diffusion” portfolio, whereas the industries 
featuring the five lowest coefficients are grouped into the “Low Diffusion” portfolio. Portfolios are rebalanced either every three 
months or every twelve months (with partial changes to the portfolio every three months).  The table reports regression results for 
zero-cost portfolios formed on the basis of the high- and low-diffusion portfolios. 
  High Minus Low 
Diffusion  
High Minus Low 
Local Diffusion  
High Minus Low  
Non-Local Diffusion 
  3-month  3-month 
(no tech) 12-month
  3-month  3-month 
(no tech)  12-month
  3-month  3-month 
(no tech)  12-month


































































































       p-value of  
       regression  0.099 
*  0.647
  0.000
***   0.003
***  0.049
**  0.000





























































* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.       4 1  
Table IX:  Information Diffusion and Future Stock Returns Across Industries 
This table presents panel regression results of relating industry-level returns prevailing over the next period to current information 
diffusion effects, industries’ current performance, individual investors’ demand for stocks at the industry level, as well industry and 
quarter effects. The regression at the quarterly horizon (Panel A) is specified as follows (Equation (5)): 
i t
ti









, , , , 1 ˆ ε + δ + γ + β + β + β = ∑∑
==
+ . 
The first regressor is the quarterly industry-level non-local information diffusion estimate, the second regressor is the lagged industry-
level return, the third regressor is the industry-level demand, and the remaining regressors are controls for industry and quarter effects. 
The industry-level demand is computed as the difference between buys and sells of stock in the given industry divided by their sum: 
BSIt,i = ($Buyst,i – $Sellst,i)/ ($Buyst,i + $Sellst,i). The annual regression (Panel B) differs only in regard to the horizon of future 
industry-level returns (i.e., the left-hand-side variable)—those returns stretch across the next four quarters. Each of the three 
specifications introduces increasingly more controls, culminating in columns (3) and (6) that feature the full set of control variables 
from Equation (5). 
  Panel A:    Panel B: 
 
Dependent Variable =  
Industry Return Over Quartert+1  
(in percent) 
 
Dependent Variable =  
Industry Return Over Quarterst+1 to t+4 
(in percent) 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4)  (5) (6) 






















  0.08 
(0.07) 







    0.01 
(0.03) 




Industry effects included?  Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes  Yes 
Quarter effects included?  Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes  Yes 
R
2 0.569  0.570  0.570    0.495 0.503  0.508 
# of observations  322 322 322    322 322  322 
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  42  
Table X: Regression of Monthly Portfolio Returns 2/91 – 12/96 (in percentages), 
Local vs. Non-Local Buys and Sales 
This table presents raw returns and risk-adjusted returns (using the four-factor model proposed 
by Carhart (1997)) of portfolio strategies based on the purchases and sales of local and non-local 
stocks that the individual investors made during the sample period. In Panel A, returns to the 
“Local” portfolio are constructed by value-weighting each month all the purchases of stocks 
local to the respective investors (i.e., headquartered within 50 miles from their residences) by the 
size of the purchase. Analogously, returns to the “Non-Local” portfolio are constructed by value-
weighting each month all the purchases of stocks that are not local to the respective investors by 
the size of the purchase. Finally, the portfolio “Difference” is the zero-cost portfolio that is long 
the “Local” portfolio and short the “Non-Local” portfolio. Portfolios are rebalanced either every 
three months (left side of the panel) or every twelve months (right side of the panel) with partial 
changes to the portfolio every three months. The structure of Panel B is analogous to the 
structure of Panel A, except for the fact that the transactions that Panel B focuses on are stock 
sales.   
 
  Panel A: Buys 
  Held in Portfolio for Three Months  Held in Portfolio for One Year 
  Local Non-Local  Difference





































    0.10
(0.28)





  Panel B: Sales 
  Held in Portfolio for Three Months  Held in Portfolio for One Year 
  Local Non-Local  Difference





































    0.05
(0.31)








* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table XI:  Information Diffusion, Correlated Preferences for Industry Allocation, 
and Structure of Local Economy 
This table presents results of assessing the contribution of word-of-mouth effects to the overall 
information diffusion effect. Toward that goal, we regress households’ industry-level purchases 
on neighbors’ purchases, variables capturing correlated preferences for industry allocation, 
variables capturing the structure of the local economy, and 322 industry-time dummy variables 
(Equation (2)). Two variables for each (h, t) observation define correlated preferences. First, we 
define the industry composition of stock positions of neighboring households (excluding 
household h itself) at the end of quarter t-1. Second, we define the industry composition of stock 
positions of the household itself at the end of quarter t-1. To capture the impact of the structure 
of the local economy, for each (h, t, i) observation we define two variables: the fraction of 
market value of companies local to household h in quarter t in industry i and the fraction of the 
labor force local to household h in quarter t employed in industry i. In this framework, estimates 
of β are conservative lower bounds on the contribution of word-of-mouth effects to the overall 
information diffusion effect. Panel A has three sections, containing estimates for all buys, local 
buys, and non-local buys, respectively. Within each section, we first show the baseline result. 
The following row in each section shows the results with the two additional independent 
variables that seek to capture preferences for industry allocation. The third row in each section of 
Panel A includes the variables that capture the structure of the local economy. The fourth row in 
each section features the results of relating the industry composition of a household’s 
investments to both preferences (the neighborhood’s and own) and the structure of the local 
economy. The final analysis, reported in the fifth row in each section, seeks to capture 
differences among households along unobservable characteristics by running the baseline 
regression from Equation (2) with the inclusion of household-level fixed effects. Panels B and C 
show results of replicating the key analyses from Panel A on two subsamples of households. 
Specifically, we sort households into two types according to the extent to which their household 
portfolio allocations at the industry level conform to those of their neighbors; the metric we use 
is the average absolute deviation in industry portfolio shares between a household and its 
neighborhood. 
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Table XI:  Information Diffusion, Correlated Preferences for Industry Allocation, 
and Structure of Local Economy (Continued) 
Composition of... 
Buys  Buys of HHs 
≤ 50 miles 
 Positions of HHs 








2 #  obs. 





***       
 









***   
 





***      4.8
(0.3)
***  4.0 
(0.3) 











***  2.7 
(0.3) 
***  0.204 1,786,666
All 
(HH Fixed Effects) 
3.6 
(0.5) 
***       
 





***       
 









***   
 





***      46.9
(1.4)
***  14.2 
(1.3) 











***  5.6 
(1.1) 
***  0.421 265,509
Local 
(HH Fixed Effects) 
17.7 
(2.5) 
***       
 





***       
 









***   
 
  0.186 1,510,390
Non-Local  7.0 
(0.4) 
***      0.7
(0.3)
***  1.0 
(0.3) 
***  0.121 1,510,390








  0.8 
(0.3) 
***  0.186 1,510,390
Non-Local 
(HH Fixed Effects) 
2.4 
(0.5) 
***       
 
  0.305 1,510,390
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table XI:  Information Diffusion, Correlated Preferences for Industry Allocation, 
and Structure of Local Economy (Continued) 
Composition of... 
Buys  Buys of HHs 
≤ 50 miles 
 Positions of HHs 








2 #  obs. 
Panel B: Similar HH Portfolios (Average Absolute Deviation in Industry Positions from HHs 





***         









***     











***  2.0 
(0.6) 





***       
 










***     












  16.6 
(2.8) 





***       
 










***     












  0.0 
(0.6) 
  0.207 377,608
Panel C: Disparate HH Portfolios (Average Absolute Deviation in Industry Positions from HHs 





***         









***     











***  2.0 
(0.5) 





***       
 










***     












***  3.4 
(2.3) 





       
 










***     












  0.8 
(0.6) 
  0.135 377,608
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
+ denotes that the difference in coefficients across the similar and disparate samples is not 
significant at the one percent level.   46 
Table XII:  Relation Between Word-of-Mouth Effects and Other Diffusion Effects and Future Stock Returns Across Industries 
This table presents panel regression results of relating industry-level returns prevailing over the next period to current information 
diffusion effects, industries’ current performance, individual investors’ demand for stocks at the industry level, as well industry and 
quarter effects. The regression at the quarterly horizon (Panel A) is specified as follows (Equation (6)): 
i t
ti













, , , , , 1 ˆ ˆ ε + δ + γ + β + β + β + β = ∑∑
==
+ .             
The first regressor is the quarterly industry-level non-local information diffusion estimate attributed to word-of-mouth effects 
(“WOM”), the second regressor is the quarterly industry-level non-local information diffusion estimate attributed to other information 
diffusion effects (“OD”), while the remaining regressors are analogous to those from Table IX. The annual regression (Panel B) 
differs only in regard to the horizon of future industry-level returns (i.e., the left-hand-side variable)—those returns stretch across the 
next four quarters. 
  Panel A:    Panel B: 
 
Dependent Variable =  
Industry Return Over Quartert+1  
(in percent) 
 
Dependent Variable =  
Industry Return Over Quarterst+1 to t+4 
(in percent) 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4)  (5) (6) 



































  0.078 
(0.069) 








    0.010 
(0.026) 




Industry effects included?  Yes Yes Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter effects included?  Yes Yes Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2 0.568  0.569  0.568   0.495  0.503  0.507 
# of observations  322 322 322   322  322  322 
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 



































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1:  Information Diffusion and Common Stock Purchases, Regression of 
Composition of Household Stock Purchases Upon Composition of Local Stock Purchases 
(in percent). The β denoted with a black bar is based on the specification over the full sample 
period from Equation 2: 
i t h
ti







, , , , ε + γ + β = ∑∑
==
− . 
The βs denoted with gray bars are based on a variant of the specification from Equation 2, 
carried out for each quarter t: 
i h
i




, , ε + γ + β = ∑
=
− . 
For the full sample, the estimate of 20.7% suggests that a 10 percentage point change in the 
neighbors’ allocation of purchases in an industry is associated with a nearly 2.1 percentage point 
change in the household’s own allocation of purchases in the industry.  
 
































0-50 50-71 71-87 87-100 100-112 112-122 122-132 132-141 141-150
(%)












                            radius [miles] 












                            radius [miles] 












                            radius [miles] 
Figure 2: Dissipation of Information Diffusion. The figure illustrates dissipation of 
information diffusion effects with distance from the household. Regions surrounding the 
household at increasingly larger distances have the same geographic area (50
2 π = 7,854 square 
miles). The regression specification is similar to Equation (2), except, instead of having one 
information diffusion regressor, the specification now has nine–one for each geographic area.  
 


























































Figure 3: Average Industry Composition of Quarterly Purchases, Firms Local to the 
Household (within 50 miles), and Corporate Workers Local to the Household, Pooled Over 
the Entire Sample Period 1/1991 – 9/1996.  
 









































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4:  Word-of-Mouth Effects and Overall Information Diffusion Effects, All Buys. The 
βs denoted with gray bars replicate the bars from Figure 1: they reflect the overall information 
dissemination effects. The βs denoted with black bars reflect conservative estimates of the word-
of-mouth effect: they come from regressions analogous to those fitted to produce Figure 1 with 
added controls for common preferences and the structure of the local economy. Full bars pertain 
to the full sample (pooled observations from 1991:1 to 1996:3), whereas the dotted bars pertain 
to estimates that come from quarterly regressions. For the full sample, the overall diffusion effect 
estimate of 20.7% suggests that a 10 percentage point change in the neighbors’ allocation of 
purchases in an industry is associated with a nearly 2.1 percentage point change in the 
household’s own allocation of purchases in the industry. 